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Mariotti and Veneziani [17]. This is quite surprising, because the Harm
principle is meant to capture a liberal requirement of noninterference and
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1 Introduction
Almost four decades after its publication, A Theory of Justice ([19]) maintains a
prominent role in political philosophy, economics, and social choice. As Konow
([14], p. 1195) has recently noted, the authors of nearly every subsequent nor-
mative treatment of justice have felt obliged to formulate their theories within
Rawlss framework, or at least to dene their positions with reference to his
contribution. Among the most inuential contributions of the book is the dif-
ference principle contained in Rawlss second principle of justice, according to
which inequalities should be allowed only insofar as they benet the worst-o¤
members of society. Both the di¤erence principle, formally captured by the
well-known maximin social welfare relation (henceforth, swr), and especially
its lexicographic extension, the leximin swr, have generated a vast literature
across disciplinary borders.
The Rawlsian di¤erence principle and its extension are usually considered to
have a strong egalitarian bias and are taken to represent the main alternative
to libertarian (and utilitarian) approaches (see, e.g., [21], [24], [29]). Indeed,
they play a prominent role in many di¤erent egalitarian theories, including in
the modern theory of equality of opportunity (see, among the many recent con-
tributions, [22], [23], [10]), in the normative analysis of international relations,
intergenerational issues, and climate change (see, e.g., [16], [24], [25]), and in
experimental approaches on egalitarian notions of fairness (for a survey, see
[14]).
The classic characterisation of leximin, in fact, is due to Hammond ([11])
and it requires an axiom (the so-called Hammond Equity axiom) with a marked
egalitarian content: in a welfaristic framework, Hammond Equity asserts that
if xi < yi < yj < xj for two utility proles x and y, for which xh = yh for all
agents h 6= i; j, then y should be (weakly) socially preferred to x. In a recent
contribution, however, Mariotti and Veneziani ([17]) show that the leximin can
be characterised using an axiom - the Harm Principle - that incorporates a liberal
view of noninterference, without any explicit egalitarian content. This result is
surprising and it raises a number of interesting issues for liberal approaches
emphasising notions of individual autonomy or freedom in political philosophy
and social choice, but it also sheds new light on the normative foundations of
standard egalitarian principles.
This paper extends the analysis of the implications of liberal views of non-
interference, as expressed in the Harm Principle, and it generalises ([17]) in a
number of directions. Formally, it is shown that a weaker version of the Harm
Principle, together with standard axioms in social choice, provides a unied
axiomatic framework to analyse a set of swrs originating from the di¤erence
principle in a welfaristic framework. Theoretically, the analysis provides a novel
statement, based on liberal principles, of the ethical intuitions behind a family
of normative principles stemming from Rawlss seminal work. On the one hand,
the Harm Principle is formally di¤erent from standard informational invariance
or separability axioms (see, e.g., [9], [21], [27]) and, unlike the latter, it has a
clear normative content. On the other hand, unlike the Hammond Equity ax-
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iom, the Harm principle does not incorporate an egalitarian intuition. Therefore,
quite surprisingly, the ethical foundations of two swrs traditionally considered
as rather egalitarian - the di¤erence principle and its lexicographic extension
- rest only on the two standard axioms of Anonymity and Pareto e¢ ciency,
and on a liberal principle incorporating a noninterfering view. No axiom with
a clear egalitarian content is necessary, and indeed the analysis in this paper
provides a new meaning to the label liberal egalitarianismusually associated
with Rawlss approach. Actually, this paper sheds new light on the importance
of the notion of justice as impartiality incorporated in the Anonymity axiom in
egalitarian approaches. This is particularly clear in societies with a nite num-
ber of agents: the Harm principle and the Pareto principle are consistent with
some of the least egalitarian swrs (e.g. the lexicographic dictatorships), and the
Anonymity axiom plays a pivotal role in determining the egalitarian outcome.
Our analysis also raises some interesting issues concerning the implications of
liberal approaches emphasising a notion of individual autonomy, or freedom: if
one endorses some standard axioms - such as Anonymity and the Pareto prin-
ciple - the adoption of an arguably weak liberal view of noninterference leads
straight to welfare egalitarianism. As noted by Mariotti and Veneziani ([17]),
liberal noninterference implies equality, an insight that is proved to be robust
in this paper.
To be specic, rst of all, in economies with a nite number of agents, it is
shown that a weaker version of the Harm Principle analysed in ([17]) is su¢ cient
to characterise the leximin social welfare ordering (henceforth, swo). This result
is interesting because the weak Harm Principle captures liberal, noninterfering
views even more clearly than the original Harm Principle. Further, based on the
weak Harm Principle, a new characterisation of the maximin swo is provided.
Second, this paper analyses the maximin and the leximin in the context
of societies with an innite number of agents. This is arguably a crucial task
for egalitarians. In fact, despite Rawlss claims to the contrary, there is no
compelling reason to restrict the application of the di¤erence principle to intra-
generational justice. In the intergenerational context, a basic concern for im-
partiality arguably implies that principles of justice be applied to all present
and future generations. The extension to the case with an innite number of
generations, however, is problematic for all of the main approaches, and indeed
impossibility results easily obtain (see [15], [31], [13], [1]). A number of recent
contributions have provided characterisation results for swrs by dropping ei-
ther completeness (see [5], [3], [6], [8], [4]) or transitivity (see [26]). But the
denition of suitable anonymous and paretian swrs is still an open question in
the innite context (for a thorough discussion, see [1]).
In this tradition, this paper provides various new characterisations of the
maximin and the leximin swrs, based on the Harm Principle, in economies
with an innite number of agents. Although various formal frameworks and
denitions have been proposed to analyse innitely-lived societies, it is shown
that the Harm Principle can be used to derive interesting results in all of the
main approaches.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 lays out the ba-
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sic framework. Section 3 characterises the leximin and the maximin swos in
economies with a nite number of agents. Section 4 provides several character-
isations of leximin and maximin swrs in societies with an innite number of
agents, in di¤erent frameworks. Section 5 concludes.
2 The framework
Let X  RN be the set of countably innite utility streams, where R is the
set of real numbers and N is the set of natural numbers. An element of X is
1u = (u1; u2; :::) and ut is the welfare level of agent t, or - in the intergenerational
context - of a representative member of generation t 2 N. For T 2 N, 1uT =
(u1; :::; uT ) denotes the T -head of 1u and T+1u = (uT+1; uT+2; :::) denotes its
T -tail, so that 1u = (1uT ;T+1 u); 1uT denotes the welfare level of the worst-
o¤ generation of the T -head of 1u, and min(1u) = min fu1; u2; :::g denotes the
welfare level of the worst-o¤ generation of 1u whenever it exists. con denotes
the stream of constant level of well-being equal to  2 R, and, for the sake of
notational simplicity, the T -head of con is denoted as 1T and the T -tail of con
is denoted as T+1. A permutation  is a bijective mapping of N onto itself. A
permutation  of N is nite if there is T 2 N such that (t) = t, 8t > T , and
 is the set of all nite permutations of N. For any 1u 2 X and any  2 , let
 (1u) =
 
u(t)

t2N be a permutation of 1u. For any T 2 N and 1u 2 X, 1uT is
a permutation of 1uT such that the components are ranked in ascending order.
For any 1u;1 v 2 X, 1u  1v if and only if ut  vt, 8t 2 N; 1u > 1v if and
only if 1u  1v and 1u 6= 1v; and 1u 1v if and only if ut > vt, 8t 2 N.
Let < be a (binary) relation over X. For any 1u;1 v 2 X, 1u < 1v stands
for (1u;1 v) 2< and 1u 6< 1v for (1u;1 v) =2<; < stands for at least as good as.
The asymmetric factor  of < is dened by 1u  1v if and only if 1u < 1v and
1v 6< 1u, and the symmetric part s of < is dened by 1u s 1v if and only if
1u < 1v and 1v < 1u. They stand, respectively, for strictly better thanand
indi¤erent to. A relation < on X is said to be: reexive if, for any 1u 2 X,
1u < 1u; complete if, for any 1u;1 v 2 X, 1u 6= 1v implies 1u < 1v or 1v < 1u;
transitive if, for any 1u;1 v;1 w 2 X, 1u < 1v < 1w implies 1u < 1w. < is a
quasi-ordering if it is reexive and transitive, while < is an ordering if it is a
complete quasi-ordering. Let < and <0 be relations on X: <0 is an extension of
< if <<0 and 0.
If there are only a nite set f1; :::; Tg = N  N of agents, or generations,
XT denotes the set of utility streams of X truncated at T = jN j, where jN j
is the cardinality of N . In order to simplify the notation, in economies with a
nite number of agents the symbol u is used instead of 1uT . With the obvious
adaptations, the notation spelled out above is carried over utility streams in
XT .
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3 Egalitarian Principles in Societies with a Fi-
nite Number of Agents
This section analyses liberal egalitarianism in societies with a nite number
of agents. First, the characterisation of the leximin swo derived by Mariotti
and Veneziani ([17], Theorem 1, p. 126) is strengthened by weakening the
main axiom incorporating a liberal view of noninterference, the Harm Principle.
Then, based on the weak Harm Principle, a novel characterisation of Rawlss
di¤erence principle, as formalised in the maximin swo, is provided.
3.1 The Leximin
According to the leximin, that society is best which lexicographically maximises
the welfare of its worst-o¤members. Formally, the leximin relation <LM=LM
[ sLM on XT is dened as follows. The asymmetric factor LM of <LM is
dened by:
u LM v , u1 > v1 or [9i 2 Nnf1g : uj = vj (8j 2 N : j < i) and ui > vi].
The symmetric factor sLM of <LM is dened by:
u LM v , ui = vi;8i 2 N .
<LM is easily shown to be an ordering. Classic analyses of the leximin swo
typically involve the following three axioms (see [11]).
Strong Pareto Optimality, SPO: 8u; v 2 XT : u > v ) u  v.
Anonymity, A: 8u 2 XT and 8 of N , u   (u).
Hammond Equity, HE. 8u; v 2 XT : ui < vi < vj < uj 9i; j 2 N , uk = vk
8k 2 Nnfi; jg ) v < u.
The rst two axioms are standard in social choice theory and need no further
comment. It is important to note, instead, that HE expresses a clear concern
for equality in welfare distributions, for it asserts that among any two welfare
allocations which are not Pareto-ranked and di¤er only in two components,
society should prefer the more egalitarian one. The classic characterisation by
Hammond ([11]) states that a swo is the leximin ordering if and only if it
satises SPO, A, and HE.1
In a recent contribution, Mariotti and Veneziani ([17]) drop HE and intro-
duce a new axiom, called the Harm Principle (HP), which is meant to capture
a liberal view of noninterference whenever individual choices have no e¤ect on
others. To be precise, starting from two welfare allocations u and v such that u
is socially preferred to v, consider two di¤erent allocations u0 and v0 such that
agent i is worse o¤ at these than at the corresponding starting allocations, the
other agents are equally well o¤, and agent i prefers u0 to v0. The decrease
1See also the related Hammond ([12]) and the generalisation by Tungodden ([28], [29]).
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in agent is welfare may be due to her negligence or her bad luck, but in any
case HP states that societys preference over u0 and v0 should coincide with is
preferences. In this sense, HP requires that, having already su¤ered a welfare
loss in both allocations, agent i should not be punished in the swo by changing
social preferences against her. This seems a rather intuitive way of capturing
a liberal view of noninterference, and the name of the axiom is meant to echo
John Stuart Mills famous formulation in his essay On Liberty (see [30], and the
discussion in [17] and [18]). Yet, although it has no explicit egalitarian content,
quite surprisingly, Mariotti and Veneziani ([17], Theorem 1, p. 126) prove that,
jointly with SPO and A, HP characterises the leximin swo.
In this paper, the implications of liberal, noninterfering views in social choice
are explored further. As a rst step, a weaker version of HP is formally stated
as follows.
Weak Harm Principle, WHP: 8u; v; u0; v0 2 XT : u  v and u0; v0 are such
that, 9i 2 N ,
u0i < ui
v0i < vi
u0j = uj 8j 6= i
v0j = vj 8j 6= i
implies v0  u0 whenever u0i > v0i:
WHP weakens the axiom proposed by Mariotti and Veneziani ([17]) in that
it does not require that societys preferences over u0 and v0 be identical with
agent is, but only that society should not reverse the strict preference between
u and v to a strict preference for v0 over u0 (possibly except when i prefers
otherwise). In this sense, the liberal content of WHP, and the requirement
that agent i should not be punished in the swo by changing social preferences
against her, is even clearer, and WHP strongly emphasises the negative pre-
scription of the Harm Principle ensuring individual protection from unjustied
interference: The surprising characterisation result provided in ([17]) can then
be strengthened.
Theorem 1. A swo < on XT is the leximin ordering if and only if it sat-
ises Anonymity (A), Strong Pareto Optimality (SPO), and the Weak Harm
Principle (WHP).
Proof. ()) Let < on XT be the leximin ordering, i.e., <=<LM . SinceWHP
is weaker than HP, the proof that <LM on XT meets SPO, A, and WHP
follows from the proof of necessity in ([17], Theorem 1, p. 126).
(() Let < on XT be a swo satisfying SPO, A, andWHP. We show that
< on XT is the leximin swo. Thus, we should prove that, 8u; v 2 XT ,
u LM v , u  v (1)
and
u LM v , u  v (2)
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First, we prove the implication ()) of (1). If u LM v, then u = v, and so u 
v, by A.
Next, we prove the implication ()) of (2). Suppose that u LM v, and
so, by denition u1 > v1 or 9t 2 f2; :::; Tg such that us = vs 81  s < t and
ut > vt. Suppose, by contradiction, that v  u. Note that since < satises A,
in what follows we can focus, without loss of generality, either on u and v, or on
the ranked vectors u and v. Therefore, suppose v  u. As SPO holds it must
be the case that vl > ul for some l > t. Let
k = minft < l  T jvl > ulg:
By A, let vi = vk and let ui = uk g, for some 1  g < k, where uk g > vk g.
Then, let two real numbers d1; d2 > 0, and consider vectors u0; v0 and the
corresponding ranked vectors u0; v0 formed from u; v as follows: rst, uk g is
lowered to uk g   d1 such that uk g   d1 > vk g; next, vk is lowered to vk   d2
such that uk > vk   d2 > uk g   d1; nally, all other entries of u and v are
unchanged. By construction u0j  v0j for all j  k, with u0k g > v0k g ; whereas
WHP, combined with A, implies v0 < u0. By SPO, d1; d2 > 0 can be chosen
so that v0  u0, without loss of generality. Consider two cases:
a) Suppose that vk > uk, but ul  vl for all l > k. It follows that u0 > v0, and
so SPO implies that u0  v0, a contradiction.
b) Suppose that vl > ul for some l > k. Note that by construction v0l = vl and
u0l = ul for all l > k. Then, let
k0 = minfk < l  T jv0l > u0lg:
where k0 > k. The above argument can be applied to u0; v0 to derive vectors
u00; v00 such that u00j  v00j for all j  k0, whereasWHP, combined with A and
SPO, implies v00  u00. And so on. After a nite number of iterations s, two
vectors us; vs can be derived such that, byWHP, combined with A and SPO,
we have that vs  us, but us > vs so that SPO implies us  vs, yielding a
contradiction.
We have proved that if u LM v then u < v: Suppose now, by contradiction,
that v  u, or equivalently v  u. Since, by our supposition, vt < ut, there
exists  > 0 such that vt < ut    < ut. Let u 2 XT be a vector such that
ut = ut    and uj = uj for all j 6= t. It follows that u LM v but v  u by
SPO and the transitivity of <. Hence, the above argument can be applied to v
and u, yielding the desired contradiction.
The properties in Theorem 1 are clearly independent.
Theorem 1 has a number of interesting theoretical implications. Firstly, it
implies that HE and WHP are equivalent in the presence of A and SPO,
even though they are logically independent. However, it can be proved that if
N = f1; 2g, then in the presence of SPO, HE impliesWHP, but the converse
is not true (see [18]). This implies that the above characterisation is far from
trivial, given that under SPO, HE is actually stronger than WHP, at least
in some cases. Secondly, and perhaps more interestingly, Theorem 1 puts the
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normative foundations of leximin under a rather di¤erent light. For, unlike in
standard results, the egalitarian swo is characterised without appealing to any
axioms with a clear egalitarian content. Actually, it is easily shown that SPO
andWHP alone are compatible with some of the least egalitarian swos, namely
the lexicographic dictatorships, which proves thatWHP imposes no signicant
egalitarian restriction. As a result, Theorem 1 highlights the normative strength
of the Anonymity axiom in determining the egalitarian outcome, an important
insight which is not obvious in standard characterisations based on HE.
The main implication of Theorem 1, however, is that it proves that the core
intuition of Mariotti and Veneziani ([17]) concerning the implications of liberal
noninterfering views is robust: a strongly egalitarian swo can be characterised
with an even weaker axiom that only incorporates a liberal view of noninterfer-
ence. In the next sections, this intuition is extended further and it is shown that
the counterintuitive implications of liberal noninterfering principles in terms of
egalitarian orderings are quite general and robust. Analogous characterisations
of a whole family of principles inspired by Rawlss theory are obtained in soci-
eties with both nite and innite populations, based on the Harm Principle.
3.2 The Di¤erence Principle
The maximin relation <M=M [ sM on XT is dened as follows. The asym-
metric factor M of <M is dened by:
u M v , u1 > v1.
The symmetric factor sM of <M is dened by:
u sM v , u1 = v1.
<M is easily shown to be an ordering. The maximin swo formalises Rawlss
di¤erence principle. As is well-known, the maximin does not satisfy SPO, and
therefore the following, weaker axiom is imposed.
Weak Pareto Optimality, WPO: 8u; v 2 XT : u v ) u  v.
Second, a continuity axiom is imposed, which represents a standard inter-
prole condition requiring the swo to vary continuosly with changes in utility
streams. This axiom is common in characterisations of the maximin swo (see,
e.g., [7]).
Continuity, C: 8u 2 XT , fv 2 XT jv < ug is closed and fv 2 XT ju < vg is
closed.
The next Theorem shows that the combination of Anonymity (A), Weak
Pareto Optimality (WPO), Continuity (C), and the Weak Harm Principle
(WHP) characterises the maximin swo.
Theorem 2. A swo < on XT is the maximin ordering if and only if it satises
Anonymity (A), Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO), Continuity (C), and the
Weak Harm Principle (WHP).
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Proof. ()) Let < on XT be the maximin ordering, i.e., <=<M . It can be
easily veried that <M on XT satisesWPO, A, C, andWHP.
(() Let < on XT be a swo satisfying A,WPO,WHP, and C. We show
that < is the maximin swo. We prove that, 8u; v 2 XT ,
u M v , u  v (3)
and
u M v , u  v. (4)
Note that as < on XT satises A, in what follows we can focus either on u
and v, or on the ranked vectors u and v, without loss of generality.
First, we show that the implication ()) of (3) is satised. Take any u; v 2
XT . Suppose that u M v , u1 > v1 and assume, by contradiction, that
v  u, or equivalently, v  u: As WPO holds, vj  uj for some j 2 N ,
otherwise a contradiction immediately obtains. We prooceed according to the
following steps.
Step 1. Let
k = min fl 2 N jvl  ulg :
By A, let vi = vk and let ui = u1. Then, consider two real numbers d1; d2 > 0,
and two vectors u0; v - together with the corresponding ranked vectors u0; v 2
XT - formed from u; v as follows: u1 is lowered to u1   d1 > v1; vk is lowered
to uk > vk   d2 > u1   d1; and all other entries of u and v are unchanged. By
construction u0j > v

j for all j  k, whereas byWHP and A, we have v < u0.
Step 2. Let
0 <  < minfu0j   vj j8j  kg
and dene v0 = v + con. By construction, v  v0, and v0j < u0j for all j  k.
WPO implies v0  v. As v < u0, by step 1, the transitivity of < implies
v0  u0.
If u0j > v
0
j for all j 2 N ,WPO implies u0  v0, a contradiction. Otherwise, let
v0l  u0l for some l > k. Then, let
k0 = min fl 2 N j v0l  u0lg
where k0 > k.
The above steps 1-2 can be applied to u0; v0 to derive vectors u00; v00 such that
u00j > v
00
j for all j  k0, whereas v00  u00. ByWPO, a contradiction is obtained
whenever u00j > v
00
j for all j 2 N . Otherwise, let v00l  u00l for some l > k0. And
so on. After a nite number s of iterations, two vectors us; vs can be derived
such that vs  us, by steps 1-2, but us  vs, byWPO, a contradiction.
Therefore, it must be u < v whenever u M v. We have to rule out the
possibility that u  v. We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that u  v. Since
v1 < u1, there exists  > 0 such that v = v+ con and v1 < u1 so that u M v.
However, byWPO and transitivity of < it follows that v  u. Then the above
reasoning can be applied to v and u to obtain the desired contradiction.
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Now, we show that the implication ()) of (4) is met as well. Suppose that
u M v , u1 = v1. Assume, to the contrary, that u 6s v. Without loss of
generality, let u  v. By A, it must be u 6= v. As u  v, it follows from C that
there exist neighbourhoods S (u) and S (v) of u and v such that u0  v0 for all
u0 2 S (u) and for all v0 2 S (v). Then, there exists v0 2 S (v) such that v0  v
and u  v0 s v0, so that u  v0 but v0 M u. By the implication (3) proved
above, it follows that v0  u, a contradiction.
The properties in Theorem 2 are clearly independent.2
The theoretical relevance of the latter result can be appreciated if Theorem 2
is compared with alternative characterisations. Unlike informational invariance
axioms often used in the literature (see, for example, [20], [21]), WHP has a
clear ethical foundation, but, as noted above, no obvious egalitarian implication.
In a recent contribution, Bosmans and Ooghe ([7]) characterise the maximin
swo using Anonymity (A), Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO), Continuity (C),
and Hammond Equity (HE). Instead, as in the case of the leximin ordering
analysed above, Theorem 2 characterises the maximin without appealing to an
axiom like HE, which arguably has a marked egalitarian content, and using
insteadWHP, which only incorporates a liberal, noninterfering view of society.
4 Egalitarian Principles in the Innitely-Lived
Society
In this section, the axiomatic analysis of the di¤erence principle and of its
lexicographic renement is extended to innitely-lived economies, focusing on
the role of liberal views of noninterference as formulated in the Harm Principle.
As already noted, the case with an innite number of agents raises a number of
issues concerning the existence and the characterisation of swos, and di¤erent
denitions of the leximin swr can be provided in order to compare (countably)
innite utility streams. In this section, rst, the framework proposed by Asheim
and Tungodden ([3]) is adopted, and an alternative characterisation of their
leximin swrs is provided. Then, a new characterisation of an innite-horizon
ordering extension of a leximin swr recently proposed by Bossert, Sprumont and
Suzumura ([8]) is provided. Finally, the framework of Asheim and Tungodden
([3]) is extended to analyse the maximin swr, and a new characterisation of the
di¤erence principle is proposed in the context of innitely-lived economies.
4.1 The Leximin SWR
Following Asheim and Tungodden, there are two di¤erent ways of formally den-
ing the leximin swr. The rst one is the so-called weak leximin, or W-Leximin,
and can be formalised as follows.
2 It is worth noting that a stronger characterisation result of the maximin swo can be
provided by replacing the standard continuity property C with the following weaker property:
Weak Continuity, WC: 8u; v 2 XT , u  v ) 9z 2 RT++ : v  (u  z).
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Denition 1. (Denition 2, [3], p. 224) For all 1u;1 v 2 X, 1u LM 1v ,
9 ~T  1 such that 8T  ~T : 1uT = 1vT ; and 1u LM 1v , 9 ~T  1 such that
8T  ~T 9t 2 f1; :::; Tg: us = vs 81  s < t and ut > vt.
The characterisation results below are based on some standard axioms. The
rst three axioms are similar to those used in the nite case, and need no further
comment, except possibly noting that in this context,WHP is weaker than the
version in Section 2 above, since it only holds for vectors with the same tail.
Finite Anonymity, FA: 81u 2 X and 8  2 , (1u)  1u.
Strong Pareto Optimality, SPO: 81u;1 v 2 X : 1u > 1v ) 1u  1v.
Weak Harm Principle, WHP: 81u;1 v;1 u0;1 v0 2 X : 9T  1 1u =
(1uT ;T+1 v)  1v, and 1u0;1 v0 are such that, 9i  T ,
u0i < ui
v0i < vi
u0j = uj 8j 6= i
v0j = vj 8j 6= i
implies 1v0  1u0 whenever u0i > v0i.
Next, following Asheim and Tungodden ([3], p. 223), an axiom is imposed,
which represents a mainly technical requirement to deal with innite dimen-
sional vectors.
Weak Preference Continuity, WPC: 81u;1 v 2 X : 9 ~T  1 such that
(1uT ;T+1 v)  1v 8T  ~T ) 1u  1v.
WPC (and the same is true for the stronger SPC discussed below) estab-
lishes a link to the standard nite setting of distributive justice, by transform-
ing the comparison of any two innite utility paths to an innite number of
comparisons of utility paths each containing a nite number of generations
([3], p. 223). In the same vein, the next axiom states that the swr should at
least be able to compare (innite-dimensional) vectors with the same tail. This
seems an obviously desirable property which imposes a minimum requirement
of completeness on the swr.
Minimal Completeness, MC: 81u; 1v 2 X, 9T  1 (1uT ;T+1 v) 6= 1v )
(1uT ;T+1 v) < 1v or 1v < (1uT ;T+1 v).
The next Theorem proves that the combination of Finite Anonymity (FA),
Strong Pareto Optimality (SPO), Weak Harm Principle (WHP), Weak Pref-
erence Continuity (WPC), and Minimal Completeness (MC), characterises the
leximin swr.
Theorem 3. < is an extension of<LM if and only if< satises Finite Anonymity
(FA), Strong Pareto Optimality (SPO), Weak Harm Principle (WHP), Weak
Preference Continuity (WPC), and Minimal Completeness (MC).
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Proof. ()) Let <LM<. It is easy to see that < meets FA and SPO.
By observing that <LM is complete for comparisons between utility streams
having the same tail it is also easy to see that < satisesWPC and MC. We
show that < meets WHP. Take any 1u;1 v;1 u0;1 v0 2 X such that 9T  1
1u = (1uT ;T+1 v)  1v, and 1u0, 1v0 are such that, 9i  T , u0i < ui, v0i < vi,
u0j = uj 8j 6= i, v0j = vj 8j 6= i. We show that 1u0  1v0 whenever u0i > v0i. As
<LM is complete for comparisons between utility streams having the same tail,
it must be true that 1u  LM 1v. Therefore, by denition, 9 ~T  1 such that
8T 0  ~T 9t 2 f1; :::; T 0g us = vs 81  s < t and ut > vt. Take any T 0  ~T . As
T 0 <1 it follows from Theorem 1 in [[17], p. 126] that there exists t  t  T 0
such that u0s = v
0
s 81  s < t and v0t < u0t . As it holds true for any T 0  ~T it
follows that 1u0  1v0 as <LM<.
(() Suppose that < satises FA, SPO,WHP,WPC, andMC. We show
that LM and LM. Take any 1u;1 v 2 X.
Assume that 1u LM 1v. By denition, 9 ~T  1 such that 8T  ~T 1uT =
1vT , and so T+1u = T+1v, for any T  ~T . It follows that 1u  1v, by FA.
Next, suppose that 1u LM 1v. By denition, 9 ~T  1 such that 8T  ~T
9t 2 f1; :::; Tg such that us = vs 81  s < t and ut > vt. Take any such T
and consider the vector 1w  (1uT ;T+1 v): Note that 1w LM 1v. We want to
show that 1w  1v. By FA and transitivity, we can consider 1 w  (1uT ;T+1 v)
and 1v  (1vT ;T+1 v) . Suppose that 1v < 1 w. We distinguish two cases.
Case 1. 1v  1 w
As SPO holds it must be the case that vl > wl for some l > t. Let
k = minft < l  T jvl > wlg:
By FA, let vi = vk and let wi = wk g, for some 1  g < k, where wk g > vk g.
Then, let two real numbers d1; d2 > 0, and consider vectors 1w0; 1v0 formed from
1 w; 1v as follows: wk g is lowered to wk g   d1 such that wk g   d1 > vk g;
vk is lowered to vk   d2 such that wk > vk   d2 > wk g   d1; and all other
entries of 1 w and 1v are unchanged. By FA, consider 1 w0 = (1 w0T ;T+1 v) and
1v
0 = (1v0T ;T+1 v). By construction w
0
j  v0j for all j  k, with w0k g > v0k g;
whereas WHP, combined with MC and FA, implies v0 < w0. Furthermore,
by SPO, it is possible to choose d1; d2 > 0, such that v0  w0, without loss of
generality. Consider two cases:
a) Suppose that vk > wk, but wl  vl for all l > k. It follows that 1 w0 > 1v0,
and so SPO implies that 1 w0  1v0, a contradiction.
b) Suppose that vl > wl for some l > k. Note that by construction v0l = vl and
w0l = wl for all l > k. Then, let
k0 = minfk < l  T jv0l > w0lg:
where k0 > k. The above argument can be applied to 1 w0; 1v0 to derive vectors
1 w
00; 1v00 such that w00j  v00j for all j  k0, whereas WHP, combined with
MC, FA, and SPO, implies 1v00  1 w00. And so on. After a nite number of
iterations s, two vectors 1 ws; 1vs can be derived such that, byWHP, combined
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with MC, FA, and SPO, we have that 1vs  1 ws, but SPO implies 1 ws 
1v
s, yielding a contradiction.
Case 2. 1v  1 w
Since, by our supposition, vt < ut  wt, there exists  > 0 such that vt <
wt   < wt. Let 1 w 2 X be a vector such that wt = wt   and wj = wj for all
j 6= t. It follows that 1 w LM 1v but 1v  1 w by SPO and the transitivity of
<. Hence, the argument of Case 1 above can be applied to 1v and 1 w, yielding
the desired contradiction.
It follows from MC that 1 w  1v. FA, combined with the transitivity of <,
implies that (1uT ; T+1v)  1v. Since it holds true for any T  ~T ,WPC implies
1u  1v, as desired.
The properties in Theorem 3 are independent (see Annex).
It is worth stressing again that in societies with an innite number of agents,
or generations, there is no obvious, and unanimously accepted, denition of the
leximin swr. Asheim and Tungodden ([3], p. 224), for example, provide an
alternative, stronger denition of the leximin - the S-Leximin - that can be
formalised as follows.
Denition 2. (Denition 1, [3], p. 224) For all 1u;1 v 2 X, 1u <LMS 1v ,
9 ~T  1 such that 8T  ~T : either 1uT = 1vT , or 9t 2 f1; :::; Tg: us = vs 81 
s < t and ut > vt.
The above analysis focuses on the W-Leximin because the continuity axiom
WPC is much weaker - and thus possibly more appealing (as argued by Basu
and Mitra [6], p. 358) - than the Strong Preference Continuity property adopted
by Asheim and Tungodden ([3], p. 223) to characterise the S-leximin. Strong
Preference Continuity can be formalised as follows.
Strong Preference Continuity, SPC: 81u;1 v 2 X : 9 ~T  1 such that
(1uT ;T+1 v) < 1v 8T  ~T , and 8 ~T  1 9T  ~T such that (1uT ;T+1 v)  1v )
1u  1v.
A result analogous to Theorem 3 can be established for the stronger deni-
tion 2 by replacingWPC with SPC. It can be easily obtained through a trivial
modication of the parts of the proof of Theorem 3 that involveWPC, and by
observing that the necessity of WHP can be easily established along the same
lines as in Theorem 3.
Theorem 4. < is an extension of<LMS if and only if< satises Finite Anonymity
(FA), Strong Pareto Optimality (SPO), Weak Harm Principle (WHP), Strong
Preference Continuity (SPC), and Minimal Completeness (MC).
The properties in Theorem 4 are independent (see Annex).
Theorems 3 and 4 identify the relevant class of leximin swrs by postulating a
continuity property on the quasi-ordering (respectively,WPC and SPC), which
represents a mainly technical requirement in ranking innite utility streams. As
axioms such as SPO and FA may be considered ethically more defensible than
continuity axioms, Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura ([8]) have not postulated
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any continuity property on the quasi-ordering and have provided a characterisa-
tion of a subclass of the class of orderings satisfying SPO, FA, and an innite
version of HE. Formally, the relationship between the characterisation of the
leximin by Bossert et al. ([8]) and that by Asheim and Tungodden ([3]) is anal-
ogous to the relationship between the characterisation of the utilitarian swr by
Basu and Mitra ([6]) and the characterisations of the more restrictive utilitar-
ian swr induced by the overtaking criterion (see the discussion in [8], p. 580).
This relationship is explored below by extending the analysis of WHP to the
framework developed by Bossert et al. ([8]).
For each T 2 N, let the leximin ordering on XT be denoted as <LMT . The
denition of the leximin swr proposed by Bossert et al. ([8]) can be formulated
as follows. Dene a relation <LT X X by letting, for all 1u;1 v 2 X,
1u <LT 1v , 1uT <LMT 1vT and T+1u  T+1v. (5)
The relation <LT can be shown to be reexive and transitive for all T 2 N.
Then the leximin swr on X is <L=
S
T2N <LT ([8], p. 586): it is reexive and
transitive, but not necessarily complete. Moreover, Bossert et al. show that <L
satises the following property ([8], p. 586, equation (14)):
81u;1 v 2 X : 9T 2 N such that 1u LT 1v , 1u L 1v. (6)
The next Theorem shows that the set of ordering extensions of <L charac-
terised by Finite Anonymity (FA), Strong Pareto Optimality (SPO), and the
weak Harm Principle (WHP), is non-empty.
Theorem 5. < is an ordering extension of <L if and only if < satises Finite
Anonymity (FA), Strong Pareto Optimality (SPO), and Weak Harm Principle
(WHP).
Proof. ()) The proof that any ordering extension of <L satises FA and
SPO is as in ([8], Theorem 2, p. 586). We only need to prove that any ordering
extension < of <L satisesWHP. Consider any 1u; 1v; 1u0; 1v0 2 X such that
9T  1 1u = (1uT ;T+1 v)  1v, and 1u0, 1v0 are such that, 9i  T , u0i < ui,
v0i < vi, u
0
j = uj 8j 6= i, v0j = vj 8j 6= i. We show that 1u0  1v0 whenever
u0i > v
0
i. Since <LMT is complete and T+1v = T+1u it cannot be 1vT <LMT
1uT , otherwise (1v;1 u) 2<L< which contradicts 1u  1v. Thus, we have that
1uT <LMT 1vT , 1vT 6<LMT 1uT , and T+1v = T+1u, so that (1u;1 v) 2LT by (5).
It follows from (6) that (1u;1 v) 2L. As 1u0 and 1v0 are such that, 9i  T ,
u0i < ui, v
0
i < vi, u
0
j = uj 8j 6= i, v0j = vj 8j 6= i, it can easily be shown, as in
([17]), that 1u0T LMT 1v0T whenever u0i > v0i. As T+1v0 = T+1u0 and 1u0T LMT
1v
0
T it follows from (5) that 1u
0 LT 1v0, and therefore 1u0 L 1v0 by (6). But
since < is an ordering extension of <L it follows that 1u0  1v0.
(() The proof is as in ([8], Theorem 2, p. 587), using the characterisation
of the T -person leximin in Theorem 1.
Theorem 5 characterises a larger class of orderings than that identied by
Theorems 3 or 4, because in the latter results an additional continuity axiom is
employed, but it is strikingly similar to the characterisation in the nite context.
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Finally, it is worth noting that the Weak Harm Principle (WHP) can also
be used to characterise the intergenerational version of the leximin swo recently
proposed by Sakai ([26]), which drops transitivity but retains completenss. In
particular, if one replaces Hammond Equity withWHP, a modied version of
his characterisation results ([26], Lemma 6, p. 17; and Theorem 5, p. 18) can
easily be proved.
4.2 The Maximin SWR
In this subsection, Rawlss di¤erence principle is analysed in the context of
economies with an innite number of agents. First of all, the analysis focuses on
the subset of utility streams that reach a minimum in a nite period. Formally,
dene the following subset Y of X :
Y = f1u 2 Xj9T 0  1: 1uT = 1uT 0 8T  T 0g .
The maximin swr can be formally dened as follows.
Denition 3. For all 1u; 1v 2 Y , 1u M 1v , min(1u) = min(1v), and
1u M 1v , min(1u) > min(1v).
Let <M=M S M . It is easy to show that <M is a complete quasi-
ordering on Y . In the framework proposed by Asheim and Tungodden ( [3]),
Denition 3 has equivalent reformulations.
Theorem 6. For all 1u; 1v 2 Y , the following statements are equivalent:
(a) min(1u) = min(1v); min(1u) > min(1v);
(b) 9 ~T  1 : 1uT = 1vT 8T  ~T ; 9 ~T  1 : 1uT > 1vT 8T  ~T ;
(c) 9 ~T  1 : 1u ~T = 1v ~T and [1uT = 1v ~T = 1vT 8T  ~T ]; 9 ~T  1 : 1u ~T > 1v ~T
and [1uT = 1u ~T and 1v ~T = 1vT 8T  ~T ].
Proof. Obvious, so omitted.
It is worth noting that the relevant ~T in part (b) may be di¤erent from that
in part (c) of the latter proposition.
In order to prove the main characterisation result, the following four stan-
dard axioms are imposed, which are analogous to those used in the nite setting,
and need no further comment, except noting that WC is a signicant weak-
ening of standard continuity axioms. Continuity requires that if 1u is strictly
better than 1v, then any vector su¢ cient close to 1u should be strictly better
than any vector su¢ cient close to 1v, and, as is well-known, in its full strength
continuity is problematic in the innite setting (see [13], [31]). WC only re-
quires the existence of some vector close to 1u such that the strict preference is
not reversed. Instead, the stronger formulation of the Harm Principle originally
proposed by Mariotti and Veneziani ([17]) is used.
Finite Anonymity, FA: 81u 2 Y and 8  2 ) (1u)  1u.
Weak Pareto Optimality, WPO: 81u; 1v 2 Y; 1u 1v ) 1u  1v.
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Harm Principle, HP: 81u;1 v;1 u0;1 v0 2 Y , 1u  1v and 1u0, 1v0 are such that
9i 2 N,
u0i < ui,
v0i < vi,
u0j = uj 8j 6= i
v0j = vj 8j 6= i
implies 1u0  1v0 whenever u0i > v0i.
Weak Continuity, WC: 81u;1 v 2 Y , 1u = (1uT ;T+1 v)  1v ) 91z 2
RN++ : 1v  1u  1z, with 1u  1z 2 Y .
In addition to the above requirements, a weak consistency requirement is
imposed.
Weak Dominance Consistency,WDC: 81u;1 v;1 w 2 Y , 1w < 1u, 1w < 1v,
9 ~T  1 (1uT ;T+1 w) < (1vT ;T+1 w) 8T  ~T ) 1u < 1v.
In analogy withWPC,WDC is mainly a technical requirement that pro-
vides a link to the nite setting by transforming the comparison of two innite
utility paths to an innite number of comparisons of utility paths each contain-
ing a nite number of generations. Axioms similar toWDC are common in the
literature (see, e.g., [6], [1], [2]).
Finally, the next axiom requires that < be complete at least when compar-
ing elements of Y with the same tail. This requirement is weak and it seems
uncontroversial, for it is obviously desirable to be able to rank as many vectors
as possible.
Minimal Completeness, MC: 81u;1 v 2 Y , 1u 6= 1v , 9T  1 : T+1u =
T+1v ) 1u < 1v or 1v < 1u.
In order to derive the main characterisation result concerning the maximin
swr, it is rst proved that any swr satisfying WC, MC, and WPO also
satises monotonicity.
Lemma 1. Let < on X be a swr satisfyingWPO,WC, and MC. Then,
81u;1 v 2 Y , 1u > (1vT ;T+1 u) for some T  1 ) 1u < (1vT ;T+1 u).
Proof. Let the premises of the statement hold. Assume, to the contrary, that
1u 6< (1vT ;T+1 u). MC implies (1vT ;T+1 u)  1u. It follows from WC that
1u  (1vT ;T+1 u)   1z for some 1z 2 RN++, with (1vT ;T+1 u)   1z  1w 2 Y .
It follows from 1u > (1vT ;T+1 u) that 1u  1w. WPO implies 1u  1w, a
contradiction.
Given Lemma 1, the next Theorem proves that the combination of the above
axioms characterises the maximin swr.
Theorem 7. < on X is an extension of <Mon Y if and only if < satises
Finite Anonymity (FA), Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO), Harm Principle
(HP), Weak Continuity (WC), Weak Dominance Consistency (WDC), and
Minimal Completeness (MC).
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Proof. ()) It is easy to see that < meets FA, WPO, HP, WC, WDC,
and MC whenever < is an extension of <M .
(() Suppose that < meets FA, WPO, HP, WC, WDC, and MC.
We show that <M<, that is, 81u; 1v 2 Y ,
1u M 1v ) 1u  1v (7)
and
1u M 1v ) 1u  1v. (8)
First we show that the implication ()) of (7) is met. For take any 1u; 1v 2 Y
such that min (1u) > min (1v). By Theorem 6 it follows from min (1u) >
min (1v) that there exists ~T  1 such that, for all T  ~T , 1u ~T > 1v ~T , 1uT = 1u ~T
and 1v ~T = 1vT . Let at  max fut; vtg, all t, and take any 1w such that wt = at+
" for some " > 0, all t  ~T , and wt > max fat; 1w ~T g, all t > ~T . Clearly, 1w 2 Y
and 1w  1v and 1w  1u. Then, take any T  ~T and consider the following
vectors: (1uT ;T+1 w) and (1vT ;T+1 w). Clearly, (1uT ;T+1 w) and (1vT ;T+1 w)
are in Y and (1uT ;T+1 w) M (1vT ;T+1 w). We show that (1uT ;T+1 w) <
(1vT ;T+1 w). Assume, to the contrary, that (1uT ;T+1 w) 6< (1vT ;T+1 w). MC
implies that (1vT ;T+1 w)  (1uT ;T+1 w). Let 1x  (1vT ;T+1 w) and 1y 
(1uT ;T+1 w), so that 1x  1y.
As FA holds, let 1x,1y be such that T+1x = T+1x = T+1y = T+1y, and
1xT , 1yT are such that x1  :::  xT and y1  :::  yT , so that 1x  1x and
1y  1y. If 1xT < 1yT then Lemma 1 and transitivity of < imply that 1y < 1x,
a contradiction. Otherwise, let xt > yt for some t  T . Let
k  min fl  T jxl > ylg .
Let 1x^ and 1y^ be two nite permutations of N such that T+1x = T+1x^ = T+1y^ =
T+1y and, for some i  T , x^i = xk and y^i = y1. By FA, 1x^  1x and 1y^  1y,
so that by transitivity 1x^  1y^. Then, let two real numbers d1; d2 > 0, and
consider vectors 1y0; 1x0 formed from 1y^ and 1x^ as follows: rst, y^i is lowered
to y^i   d1 > x1; next, x^i is lowered to x^i   d2 such that yk > x^i   d2 > y^i   d1;
nally, all other entries of 1y^ and 1x^ are unchanged. Clearly 1y0; 1x0 2 Y and
it follows from HP that 1x0  1y0. Let 1x0 and 1y0 be two nite permutations
of N such that T+1x0 = T+1x0 = T+1y0 = T+1y0 and 1x0T , 1y0T are such that
x01  :::  x0T and y01  :::  y0T . By construction, y0j  x0j for all j  k, with
strict inequality holding for at least some j. By FA and transitivity, 1x0  1y0.
If y0j  x0j for all j  T , Lemma 1 implies 1y0 < 1x0, a contradiction. Otherwise,
let x0l > y
0
l for some T  l > k. Then, let
k0  min fl  T j x0l > y0lg
where k0 > k. The above reasoning can be applied to 1y0 and 1x0 to derive
vectors 1y00 and 1x00 such that 1y00; 1x00 2 Y; and y00j  x00j for all j  k0, with
strict inequality holding for at least some j, whereas 1x00  1y00. By Lemma 1, a
contradiction is obtained whenever y00j  x00j for all j  T . Otherwise, let x00l > y00l
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for some T  l > k0. And so on. After a nite number s of iterations, two vectors
1y
s, 1xs can be derived such that 1xs  1ys, but 1ys < 1xs, by Lemma 1, a
contradiction. We conclude that 1y  (1uT ;T+1 w) < 1x  (1vT ;T+1 w).
Since (1uT ;T+1 w) < (1vT ;T+1 w) for any T  ~T and WPO implies that
1w  1u and 1w  1v, it follows from WDC that 1u < 1v. We show that
1u  1v. Assume that 1v < 1u so that 1v  1u. Take any 0 <  <
(min (1u) min (1v)) and consider 1v + con  1v 2 Y . The transitivity of
< and WPO imply that 1v  1u but min (1u) > min (1v). The above rea-
soning can be applied to 1u and 1v by taking a vector 1w0 2 Y such that
1w
0  1u and 1w0  1v to arrive to the conclusion that 1u < 1v which yields
the desired contradiction.
Next, we show that the implication ()) of (8) is met as well. Take any
1u; 1v 2 Y such that min (1u) = min (1v). By Theorem 6 it follows that
9 ~T  1 such that 1u ~T = 1v ~T and 1uT = 1u ~T = 1vT 8T  ~T . If 1v =  (1u) for
some  2 , FA implies 1u  1v. Otherwise, let 1v 6=  (1u) for all  2 .
Let at  max fut; vtg, all t, and take any 1w such that wt = at + " for some
" > 0, all t  ~T , and wt > max fat; 1w ~T g, all t > ~T . Clearly, 1w 2 Y and
1w  1v and 1w  1u. Then, take any T  ~T and consider the vectors
(1uT ;T+1 w) and (1vT ;T+1 w). Clearly, (1uT ;T+1 w) and (1vT ;T+1 w) are in Y .
Let 1x  (1vT ;T+1 w) and 1y  (1uT ;T+1 w), so that min (1x) = min (1y).
We show that 1x  1y. Assume, to the contrary, that 1x 6 1y, so that either
1x  1y or 1y  1x holds byMC. Without loss of generality, suppose 1y  1x.
As < meetsWC it follows that, for some 1z 2 RN++ such that (1y   1z) 2 Y ,
1x  1y   1z. Since min (1x) > min (1y   1z) it follows from the implication
()) of (7) proved above that 1x  (1y   1z), a contradiction. Therefore 1u M
1v ) (1uT ;T+1 w)  (1vT ;T+1 w) for any T  ~T . Then noting that 1w  1v
and 1w  1u byWPO,WDC implies 1u  1v:
The properties in Theorem 7 are independent (see Annex).
Theorem 7 provides an original characterisation of the maximin swr in
societies with an innite number of agents. This result is interesting per se, as
compared to alternative characterisations of the maximin. For example, Lauwers
([15]) characterises the maximin swo by an anonymous social welfare function
(swf) dened over the set of bounded innite utility streams, by imposing a
strong version of HE according to which for any two bounded innite vectors
1u, 1v such that ui  vi  vj  uj for some i; j 2 N and uk = vk 8k 2 Nnfi; jg,
then 1v < 1u. The main focus of this paper is di¤erent and so the question
of the characterisation of the maximin swo by an anonymous and liberal swf
remains open. It is worth noting, however, that Theorem 7 does characterise
the maximin swr on a di¤erent set of innite utility streams, which can be
unbounded above, and to this aim neither the continuity condition, nor to the
so-called repetition approximation principleimposed by Lauwers ([15], p. 146)
are necessary. Indeed, subject to the domain restriction, and except for the
rather mild conditionWDC, the axioms are strikingly similar to those used to
characterise the maximin swo in nite economies.3
3This is even more evident in the light of the discussion in footnote 2 above.
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Perhaps more importantly, Theorem 7 provides further support to the main
theoretical arguments of this paper. For it conrms that the main intuitions
concerning the role of the liberal notion of noninterference embodied in the
Harm Principle are robust and they do not depend on the specic denition of
the maximin and leximin swr adopted to rank innite utility streams.
5 Conclusions
This paper provides a novel analysis of liberal egalitarian principles stemming
from John Rawlss seminal work, in societies with a nite and an innite num-
ber of agents. A unied framework of analysis is set up, which allows one to
characterise a family of egalitarian principles by means of a weaker version of
a new axiom - the Harm Principle - recently proposed in [17]. This is quite
surprising, because the Harm Principle is meant to capture a liberal require-
ment of noninterference and it incorporates no obvious egalitarian content. A
set of new characterisations of the maximin and of its lexicographic renement
are derived, including in the intergenerational context with an innite number
of agents and using di¤erent denitions of the relevant swrs proposed in the
literature.
The results presented in this paper have two main sets of implications from
a theoretical viewpoint. First, they shed new light on the ethical foundations of
the egalitarian approaches stemming from Rawlss di¤erence principle. In fact,
both the leximin and the maximin are characterised by some standard axioms
(such as Anonymity and the Pareto Principle) together with a liberal principle
incorporating only a noninterfering view of society. No axiom with an explicitly
egalitarian content is necessary in order to derive the main liberal egalitarian
principles. Second, from the viewpoint of liberal approaches emphasising a
notion of individual autonomy, or freedom, they have a rather counterintuitive
implication. For they prove that, in a number of di¤erent contexts, liberal
noninterfering principles lead straight to welfare egalitarianism.
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Annex: Independence of Axioms
The proofs of the independence of the axioms used to characterise the maximin
and leximin swo are obvious and therefore they are omitted. It is worth noting,
however, that some of the examples below can be easily adapted to apply to the
nite context.
Independence of axioms used in Theorem 3
In order to complete the proof of Theorem 3, we show that the axioms are tight.
For an example violating only FA, dene < on X in the following way:
81u; 1v 2 X,
1u = 1v ) 1u  1v
9T 2 N : ut = vt 8t < T and uT > vT ) 1u  1v
The swr < on X is not an extension of the leximin swr <LM . The swr <
on X satises all properties except FA.
For an example violating only SPO, dene < on X in the following way:
81u; 1v 2 X, 1u  1v. The swr < on X is not an extension of the leximin swr
<LM . Clearly, the swr < on X satises all properties except SPO.
For an example violating only WHP, dene < on X to be the leximax
swr, i.e., 81u;1 v 2 X,
1u LX 1v , 9 ~T  1; 8T  ~T : 1uT = 1vT ,
and
1u LX 1v , 9 ~T  1, 8T  ~T ,9t 2 f1; :::; Tg : us = vs (8t < s  T ) and ut > vt.
The swr < on X is not an extension of the leximin swr. The swr < on X
satises all properties exceptWHP.
For an example violating only MC, dene < on X in the following way:
81u,1v 2 X,
9 2  : 1u =  (1v)) 1u  1v
1u > 1v ) 1u  1v
The swr < on X is not an extension of the leximin swr. The swr < on X
satises all properties except MC.
For an example violating only WPC, 8T 2 N, let the leximin ordering on
XT be denoted as <LMT . Dene <LT on X as in (5). Then, let <=
S
T2N <LT .
By denition, this relation is reexive and transitive. The swr < on X is
not an extension of the leximin swr. The swr < on X satises all properties
butWPC. [To see thatWPC is violated consider the following vectors, 1v =
(3; con0) and 1u = (2; con1). Then, (1u;1 v) 62 and ((1uT ;T+1 v) ;1 v) 2LT
8T  2].
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Independence of axioms used in Theorem 4
In order to complete the proof of Theorem 4, we show that the axioms are tight.
As Strong Preference Continuity (SPC) implies Weak Preference Continuity
(WPC), the above examples show that the axioms used in Theorem 4 are tight
as well.
Independence of axioms used in Theorem 7
In order to complete the proof of Theorem 7, we show that the axioms are tight.
For an example violating only FA, dene < on X in the following way:
81u; 1v 2 X, i) u1 = v1 , 1u  1v; ii) u1 > v1 , 1u  1v. The swr < on
X is not an extension of the maximin swr <M . The swr < on X satises all
properties except FA.
For an example violating only WPO, dene < on X in the following way:
81u; 1v 2 X, 1u  1v. The swr < on X is not an extension of the maximin
swr <M . The swr < on X satises all properties exceptWPO.
For an example violating only HP, dene < on X in the following way: for
all 1u;1 v 2 X, 1u < 1v , 9 ~T  1 such that 8T  ~T :
PT
t=1 ut 
PT
t=1 vt. The
swr < on X is not an extension of the maximin swr <M . The swr < on X
satises all properties except HP.
For an example violating only WC, dene < on X in the following way:
81u; 1v 2 X, 1u < 1v , 9 ~T  1 such that 8T  ~T : either 1uT = 1vT , or
9t 2 f1; :::; Tg: us = vs 81  s < t and ut > vt. The swr < on X is not an
extension of the maximin swr <M . The swr < on X satises all properties
exceptWC.
For an example violating only WDC, dene < on X in the following way:
81u; 1v 2 Y ,
1u  M 1v, 9T  1 : Tu = T v ) 1u  1v
1u  M 1v ) 1u  1v
1u  M 1v, /9T  1 : Tu = T v ) 1u 6< 1v and 1v 6< 1u.
Furthermore, 81u 2 XnY and 1v 2 X : 1u 6< 1v and 1v 6< 1u. The swr < on
X is not an extension of the maximin swr <M . The swr < on X satises all
properties exceptWDC.
For an example violating only MC, let  be a permutation of N. Let
 be the set of all permutations of N. Dene < on X in the following way:
81u,1v 2 X,
1u =  (1v)9 2 , 1u  1v
1u   (1v)9 2 , 1u  1v
The swr < on X is not an extension of the maximin swr <M . The swr <
on X satises all properties except MC.
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